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“Equity” is a buzz word that now pervades our national 
political system in debates about taxation, immigration, and 
healthcare reform. It was the main focus of the 2013 mayor race 
in New York City, arguably propelling Mayor Bill de Blasio to 
victory in a city that has the most inequitable distribution of 
income in the nation.1  The debate has trickled down to parks, 
where a handful of innovative private corporations have 
transformed flagship parks while most neighborhood parks 
languish. 
This paper addresses the most innovative, alternative means 
for funding parks in New York City and New York State. The 
debate is critical in light of the chronic budget shortfalls of the 
New York City Department of Parks and Recreation (NYC Parks) 
 
* Christopher Rizzo is counsel at Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP and co-
director of its environmental and land-use group. 
 1. Norm Fruchter, The Aftermath of the PS 2013 Campaign: Mayor de 
Blasio’s First Hundred Days, ANNENBERG INSTITUTE FOR SCHOOL REFORM AT 
BROWN UNIVERSITY (May 8, 2014), shttp://annenberginstitute.org/?q=commentary 
/2014/05/aftermath-ps-2013-campaign-mayor-de-blasio’s-first-hundred-day, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8S5D-VU66. 
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and New York State Office of Parks Recreation and Historic 
Preservation (OPRHP).2  Funding problems are likely to worsen 
in coming years as parks compete for funding with aging 
subways, bridges, water supply, and sewers. At the same time, 
funding needs will grow: the City and State will increasingly rely 
on coastal parks to serve as buffers to climate change.3  New and 
existing waterfront parks will, in turn, require exponentially 
more care and maintenance than traditional upland parks. 
Private efforts have successfully transformed a select few 
parks,4 which has created allegations of park inequity at a time 
when many neighborhood parks are overgrown and 
understaffed.5  Public-private partnerships reflect a national 
debate about the proper role of the private sector in maintaining 
parks, highways, bridges, and other essential civic infrastructure. 
But for most neighborhood parks the debate is irrelevant. They 
completely lack access to either adequate public funding or 
private revenue.  One-time infusions of public capital dollars into 
the neediest parks cannot solve the ongoing operation and 
maintenance problem.6 
This paper identifies an array of alternative revenue 
strategies to solve this inequitable situation.  It then addresses 
the challenge of adapting strategies developed in the  highest 
income communities to resolving disparate park conditions in 
 
 2. The New York League of Conservation Voters and New Yorkers for 
Parks, led by executive directors Marcia Bystryn and Tupper Thomas 
(respectively), jointly commissioned this paper. The viewpoints in this paper are 
those of the author, not either organization. 
 3. PLANYC, NEW YORK CITY WETLANDS STRATEGY (2012), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/nyc_wetlands_strategy.pdf 
[hereinafter N.Y.C. WETLANDS STRATEGY]. 
 4. Some of the City’s most successful private park operators include Central 
Park Conservancy, Bryant Park Corporation, Friends of the Highline, and 
Prospect Park Alliance.  Some parks are successfully operated by public benefit 
corporations including the Battery Park City Authority, Brooklyn Bridge Park 
Corporation, Hudson River Park Trust, Trust for Governors Island, and 
Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation. 
 5. See Mara Gay, Inequality Seen in City Parks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2014, 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230383430457952012265292129
0, archived at http://perma.cc/KY43-LA37. 
 6. See ALLIANCE FOR NEW YORK STATE PARKS, PROTECT THEIR FUTURE: NEW 
YORK’S STATE PARKS IN CRISIS (2010), available at http://www.ptny.org/pdfs/ 
advocacy/parkreport2011.pdf [hereinafter ALLIANCE FOR PARKS]. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/1
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other neighborhoods. While this paper focuses on examples from 
New York City, the practices discussed are applicable throughout 
the State, including state parks that have also suffered from 
funding shortfalls in the past decade.7 
II. ALTERNATIVE REVENUE OPTIONS 
There is no substitute for adequate funding for parks from 
the general budget. This paper, however, focuses on five 
alternative, high-revenue options: (1) zoning incentives, (2) park 
improvement districts, (3) partnerships with public infrastructure 
agencies, (4) state public benefit corporations, and (5) existing 
federal and state park funds that do not rely on new tax 
revenues. These options are readily permitted by law and are 
already in limited use. They therefore present the best options for 
getting more money into parks without wading into the political 
instability of Albany or Washington, D.C., or confronting the 
nation’s antipathy to new taxes.  The paper also briefly addresses 
eight other revenue strategies that may be useful on a more 
limited basis.8 
This paper does not evaluate the legality of private 
management of public parks.  Despite criticism about the legality 
of private operation of parks, the arrangement is perfectly legal 
so long as it serves park purposes.9  In fact, conservancies 
operating flagship parks are on the whole successful. Rather than 
discourage creative, private management models, park advocates 
 
 7. See generally ALLIANCE FOR PARKS, supra note 6. 
 8. This paper does not address private philanthropy, which is highly 
desirable, but an unlikely source of reliable maintenance funds for most parks.  
The exclusion of private donations from this paper should not discourage park 
advocates from pursuing private philanthropy in every way possible.  The 
Central Park Conservancy and Friends of the High Line have been very 
successful in getting tens of millions of dollars in donations in the past few 
years, which have transformed these corporations and the parks they operate. 
E.g., Lisa W. Foderaro, New York Parks In Less Affluent Areas Lack Big Gifts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/nyregion/new-
york-parks-in-less-affluent-areas-lack-big-gifts.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7TS3-3TVE. 
 9. See generally Robert M. Wolff & Mark B. Owens, A Review of Case Law 
on Public-Private Cooperative Ventures, 3 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 16, 18 
(1993). 
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must embrace public-private partnerships if neighborhood parks 
are to flourish. 
III. CITY AND STATE AUTHORITY TO PURSUE 
ALTERNATIVE REVENUE SOURCES 
The New York City Charter provides clear authority to the 
Commissioner to pursue alternative revenues and public-private 
partnerships,10 and the State’s highest court has repeatedly 
affirmed the City’s authority to enter into private operation 
agreements for portions of public parks. For example, in 795 Fifth 
Ave. Corp. v. City of New York (1965), the New York Court of 
Appeals approved a high-profile restaurant concession in Central 
Park.11  In Union Square Park Cmty Coal. Inc. v. NYC Dep’t of 
Parks & Recreation (2014), the New York Court of Appeals 
approved the creation of a new restaurant in Union Square’s 
historic pavilion.12  Courts have not yet addressed management 
agreements that allocate responsibility for an entire park to a 
private entity like the Central Park Conservancy. It is likely, 
however, that courts will dismiss these sorts of challenges and 
allow public-private partnerships so long as they genuinely 
enhance rather than diminish the public’s overall use of a park.13 
At the state level, the New York State Office of Parks 
Recreation and Historic Preservation has wide discretion to 
pursue public-private partnerships under state law.14  It does so 
and raises about $100 million annually, providing over one half of 
its operating budget.15  In fact, in 2009 the agency adopted its 
“Policy on Public/Private Partnerships in New York State Parks 
 
 10. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER § 533(a)(10)-(11), (b)(4) (2013). 
 11. See 795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 205 N.E.2d 850, 851 
(N.Y.1965). 
 12. See Union Square Park Cmty. Coal., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Parks & 
Recreation, 8 N.E.3d 797, 801 (N.Y. 2014). 
 13. Union Square, 8 N.E.3d at 801 (“Commissioner is vested by law with 
broad powers for the maintenance and improvement of the city's parks’ and that 
judicial interference would be ‘justified only when a total lack of power is shown 
. . . . ”) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
 14. N.Y. PARKS REC. & HIST. PRESERV. LAW § 3.09(6) (McKinney 2014). 
 15. See ALLIANCE FOR PARKS, supra note 6, at 5. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/1
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and Historic Sites” to promote public-private revenue streams.16  
New York City lacks a similar policy, but should develop one. 
IV. ZONING INCENTIVES 
Zoning incentives provide the most promise for raising 
significant funds for parks by allowing municipalities to tap 
directly into the real estate industry for capital and maintenance 
funds. State law authorizes municipalities to craft a variety of 
zoning incentives to preserve open space, and two are worth 
discussing in the context of maintaining existing parks.17  The 
first would involve transfers of development rights (TDR), 
whereby a municipality zones parks and sells the resulting 
development rights in exchange for payments into an endowment 
for a particular park.18  The second would involve incentive 
zoning whereby developers would pay into endowments for 
particular parks in exchange for the right to build bigger 
buildings nearby.19  Both tools are already in limited use in the 
New York City for preservation of landmarks and creation of 
affordable housing. 
A. TDR 
New York law allows municipalities to create zoning 
programs to transfer development rights from one site to another 
to advance a wide range of public purposes.20  They include 
efforts to “protect the natural, scenic or agricultural qualities of 
open lands, to enhance sites and areas of special character or 
special historical, cultural, aesthetic or economic interest or value 
and to enable and encourage flexibility of design and careful 
management of land in recognition of land as a basic and 
 
 16. See NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION AND HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION, POLICY ON PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN NEW YORK STATE 
PARKS AND HISTORIC SITES (2009) (signed by Commissioner Carol Ash on March 
12, 2009). 
 17. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 81-d (McKinney 2014); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261-b 
(McKinney 2014). 
 18. See infra Part IV.A. 
 19. See infra Part IV.B. 
 20. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-f. 
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valuable natural resources.”21  The programs are simple: 
developers can acquire development rights from one site and use 
them on another. The sending site loses those development rights 
forever, but the site’s owner receives market-rate compensation.22  
State law requires municipalities to implement TDR programs in 
accordance with a “well-considered plan” and subject them to 
environmental review under the State Environmental Quality 
Review Act—requirements that apply to all zoning.23  A 
successful TDR program must therefore designate suitable 
receiving sites that (1) can accommodate additional bulk and (2) 
that are likely to attract the interest of developers.24 
TDR programs are unquestionably suitable for preserving 
unprotected land in private hands. For example, Suffolk County 
has a very successful program whereby developers can “buy” 
development rights from owners of sensitive Pine Barren habitat 
and use the rights in designated receiving zones.25  The owners 
receive compensation for giving up development rights on their 
land, and growth is directed to locations near existing transit, 
schools and other amenities. Developers can build denser 
developments in receiving zones than would otherwise be 
allowed.26 
 
 21. Id. § 20-f(2). 
 22. Id. § 20-f(2)(e). 
 23. Id. § 20-f(2)(a). 
 24. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-f(2)(a). The law adds one additional 
environmental review requirement beyond that normally required by SEQRA—
evaluation of the impact of TDR on potential development of low and moderate 
income housing in sending districts. Id. § 20-f(2)(f). The law’s concern is that by 
reducing the allowable density in preservation zones, future construction of low 
and moderate income housing will end. See id. 
 25. CENTRAL PINE BARRENS JOINT PLANNING & POLICY COMM’N, THE PINE 
BARRENS CREDIT: TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS IN SUFFOLK  COUNTY, NY 
(2010), available at http://pb.state.ny.us/pbc/pbc_overview.pdf. 
 26. New York State created the Central Pine Barrens Joint Planning and 
Policy Commission in 1993 to oversee the creation of the TDR program aimed at 
protecting the sensitive Pine Barrens region of Suffolk County, New York.  See 
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERVATION LAW § 57-0119 (McKinney 2014). Amendments 
followed to the zoning codes of the towns of Brookhaven, Riverhead, and 
Southhampton to implement the restrictions and TDR program. Information 
about the Commission’s work can be found at New York State’s Central Pine 
Barrens, http://www.pb.state.ny.us/, archived at http://perma.cc/6JQQ-2TJV. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/1
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There is a limited track record for using TDR programs to 
fund existing parks.  New York City has a limited TDR program 
intended to benefit an existing open space, the High Line, a 1.45 
mile-long park constructed on an elevated former freight rail 
line.27  Under the 2005 Special West Chelsea District regulations, 
owners of development sites under the High Line can buy 1.0 
FAR (floor area ratio) of development rights by making a fifty 
dollar per square foot contribution to the High Line Improvement 
Fund.28  The hybrid TDR/incentive scheme is limited: the 
transferred floor area is restricted to commercial development 
and can only be used after the site owner has sold its existing 
development rights to eligible receiving lots in the Special West 
Chelsea District.29  Developers have seldom used the program to 
date.30  The Hudson River Park Trust is also exploring a more 
traditional TDR program to sell development rights from its 
decaying Pier 40 to potential development sites on the other side 
of an adjacent highway.31 
Except for the limited TDR program for the High Line, New 
York municipalities have not used the programs to generate 
funds for existing parks or protected open spaces.  Admittedly, 
there are two complications to be overcome. First, state law 
requires sending zones to thereafter be protected through a 
conservation easement, which is a preservation tool generally 
 
 27. CITY PLANNING COMM’N, CITY OF NEW YORK, ZONING RESOLUTION § 98-30, 
31 (2015), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/zone/art09c08.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/P42K-EXVS. 
 28. Id. § 98-35. 
 29. Id. § 98-33. 
 30. See, e.g., Eliot Brown, Developers Want Easier Access to High Line Air 
Rights; But Should City Fix Something that Doesn't Look Broken?, N.Y. 
OBSERVER, Feb. 13, 2008, http://observer.com/2008/02/developers-want-easier-
access-to-high-line-air-rights-but-should-city-fix-something-that-doesnt-look-
broken/, archived at http://perma.cc/DNZ6-2FDU (developers’ desire for easier 
access may be a factor leading to the infrequent use of the fund). 
 31. Charles V. Bagli,  Possible Deal May Bring Money to Repair Pier 40 in 
Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/ 
16/nyregion/possible-deal-may-bring-money-to-repair-pier-40-in-manhattan 
.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/3NBC-MDPM. 
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used on privately owned land.32  Second, most city parks are not 
zoned and thus do not have any development rights to sell.33 
The first problem is resolvable because parks are already 
protected under various state and city laws, which provide far 
stronger protections than a conservation easement.34  Moreover, 
there appears to be no bar to creating a conservation easement to 
protect existing parkland, supplementing the protections of the 
public trust doctrine.35  Municipalities regularly give or sell 
easements to utility companies for gas and electric lines through 
parks.36 
The second problem is resolvable because the municipalities 
can zone parks. In fact, some New York City parks are zoned. For 
example: 
 Governors Island is zoned R3-2 (0.5 FAR)) 
 Forthcoming Pier 42 Park is zoned M1-4 (2.0 FAR) 
 Portions of Lemon Creek Park are zoned C3 (0.5 
FAR) 
 Mount Loretto State Preserve is zoned R1-1 (0.5 
FAR) 
 Shooters Island is zoned M3-1 (2.0 FAR) 
 Brooklyn Bridge Park is zoned M2-1 (2.0 FAR) 
 
 32. N.Y ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0303 (McKinney 2014) (defining 
conservation easements allowable by law). 
 33. New York City zones land as residential, commercial or manufacturing, 
which provides the land with development rights and restrictions. Most parks, 
especially those that were parks before the 1961 zoning resolution, have no 
zoning designation. 
 34. See Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 
1055 (N.Y. 2001) (Public Trust Doctrine, reflected in case law and statutes, 
requires parks’ use for non-parks-related purposes to have approval of the state 
legislature); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(2) (McKinney 2014). 
 35. To date, this type of easement is not precluded by legislation or case law. 
See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0303 (McKinney 2014). 
 36. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION & HISTORIC PRES., 
HANDBOOK ON THE ALIENATION AND CONVERSION OF MUNICPAL PARKLAND IN NEW 
YORK 28-29 (2012), available at http://parks.ny.gov/publications/documents 
/AlienationHandbook.pdf [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. Unless it qualifies as de 
minimis and thus exempt from the public trust doctrine, the State Legislature 
must authorize the grant of an easement over parkland for nonpark purposes, 
including utilities. See id. at 7. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/1
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 Hudson River Park is zoned M2-3 (2.0 FAR)37 
These zoning classifications are relics of the prior uses of 
these parks. But an innovative TDR zoning scheme could place 
zoning classifications on existing parkland in order to create 
development rights. There are potentially billions of dollars in 
development rights at stake. 
B. Incentive Zoning in New York City 
Incentive zoning schemes avoid the awkwardness of the TDR 
option described above.  New York State law allows 
municipalities to create zoning “incentives or bonuses” to advance 
physical, cultural or social policies.38  Developers that agree to 
pay into a public improvement fund or construct public amenities 
may earn the right to bypass various zoning limitations. For 
example, New York City has an “inclusionary housing” bonus 
that allows 20% more floor area in exchange for constructing 
affordable housing in certain high-density residential zoning 
districts.39  There is no bar to creating a similar scheme for a 
developer’s making financing contributions to the maintenance of 
nearby parkland in return for added bulk on their buildings.40 
As with any zoning scheme, incentive zoning must be 
developed in accordance with a well-considered plan and subject 
to an environmental review.41  The municipality must also 
consider the impact of incentive zoning on affordable housing, as 
it would with TDR.42  Structured properly, zoning incentives for 
park funding should increase the amount of affordable housing 
while simultaneously benefitting parks, thus advancing Mayor 
 
 37. To find zoning maps for each park listed above, see CITY OF NEW YORK, 
DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, Zoning Maps (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html 
/dcp/html/zone/zh_zmaptable.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/DMJ6-GRTG. 
 38. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 81-d(1)(c) (McKinney 2014). 
 39. See generally CITY PLANNING COMM’N, CITY OF NEW YORK, ZONING 
RESOLUTION art. II ch. 3 §§ 23-90, 23-952 (2013). 
 40. An incentive zoning scheme can require developers to provide specific 
capital improvements for the public (e.g., transit improvements) or provide 
payments for specific civic purposes.  N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 81-d(3)(h). 
 41. Id. § 81-d(3)(d). 
 42. Id. § 81-d(3)(g). 
9
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Bill de Blasio’s goal of creating or preserving 200,000 units of 
affordable housing.43 
V. INFRASTRUCTURE AND PUBLIC-PUBLIC 
PARTNERSHIPS 
Direct state and federal funding for parks is likely to be very 
constrained over the next decade.44  It appears likely, however, 
that there will be money available for (1) stormwater control and 
climate resiliency, (2) transportation, (3) affordable housing, and 
(4) public health.45  NYC Parks and OPRHP need to strategize 
about creating partnerships with public agencies receiving these 
funds to benefit parks. Barring these public-public partnerships, 
there is little federal and state funding available directly for 
parks. 
A. Climate Change and Stormwater Management 
Hurricane Sandy had a devastating impact on coastal parks. 
The City is using federal funds to create more resilient coastlines, 
particularly on the Rockaway Peninsula and Staten Island.46  
Congress allocated over $60 billion to Hurricane Sandy relief in 
the tri-state region including New York City.47  HUD, which 
received $16 billion in Community Development Block Grants 
(CDBGs), has already allocated $3.2 billion directly to New York 
 
 43. BILL DE BLASIO & ALICIA GLEN, CITY OF NEW YORK, HOUSING NEW YORK, A 
FIVE-BOROUGH TEN-YEAR PLAN 5 (2014), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html 
/housing/assets/downloads/pdf/housing_plan.pdf. 
 44. See infra Part VIII. 
 45. See generally infra Part VIII. 
 46. The Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency allows resiliency projects 
to be tracked by location. See OFFICE OF RECOVERY AND RESILIENCY, CITY OF   
NEW YORK, PLANYC PROGRESS REPORT 2014 (2014), available                              
at http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/downloads/pdf/140422_PlaNYCP-Report_ 
FINAL_Web.pdf. 
 47. Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 4, 
36 (2013) (allocating billions to various agencies, including $16 billion to the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for Community 
Development Block Grants); see also Raymond Hernandez, $51 Billion in Aid for 
Hurricane Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
01/29/nyregion/congress-gives-final-approval-to-hurricane-sandy-aid.html?_r=0, 
archived at http://perma.cc/P9ZW-PTVE. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/1
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City.48  The State received even more monies from the federal 
government to be used through areas impacted by Sandy, 
including the City. 
The City and State are vigorously planning to use these 
funds for rebuilding and improving its coastal parks.49  They are 
up against a clock: Congress requires the relief funds to be 
expended by September 30, 2017,50 and HUD requires its funds 
to be expended within two years of allocation.51  The very 
complicated coastal barriers, dunes, reefs, rehabilitated wetlands 
and other ecosystem infrastructure created with these disaster 
relief funds can be built quickly, but will require maintenance 
throughout their usable life.  HUD regulations generally limit use 
of CDBG funds to initial improvements, not long-term 
maintenance.52  However, it is possible that a fund or endowment 
could be established with CDBG monies for future capital 
improvements to storm-related infrastructure in parks.53  There 
are compelling policy reasons to do so, as long-term maintenance 
 
 48. Allocations, Common Application, Waivers, and Alternative 
Requirements for Grantees Receiving Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) Disaster Recovery Funds in Response to Hurricane Sandy, 78 Fed. Reg. 
14,329, (Mar. 5, 2013); Second Allocation, Waivers, and Alternative 
Requirements for Grantees Receiving Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) Disaster Recovery Funds in Response to Hurricane Sandy, 78 Fed. Reg. 
69,104, (Nov. 18, 2013). 
 49. See generally CITY OF NEW YORK, A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK 
ch. 21, at 426-27 (2013), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/downloads 
/pdf/final_report/Ch21_Appendix_Initiatives_FINAL_singles.pdf. 
 50. 127 Stat. at 36; Allocations, Common Application, Waivers, and 
Alternative Requirements for Grantees Receiving Community Development 
Block Grant (CDBG) Disaster Recovery Funds in Response to Hurricane Sandy, 
78 Fed. Reg. 14,329, 14,332. 
 51. Allocations, Common Application, Waivers, and Alternative 
Requirements for Grantees Receiving Community Development Block Grant 
(CDBG) Disaster Recovery Funds in Response to Hurricane Sandy, 78 Fed. Reg. 
14,329, 14,332. 
 52. See generally 24 CFR § 570.201 (2014) (lists eligible activities); Categories 
of Eligible Activities, in COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM 
(2001), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id= 
DOC_17133.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JTP7-EEQS. HUD guidance 
explains that operation and maintenance is generally not permitted, but further 
explains that certain operating and maintenance-type activities necessary to 
arrest imminent dangers are allowed. Id. at 2-30, 2-88; see also 24 C.F.R. § 
570.207(b)(2). 
 53. See generally Categories of Eligible Activities, supra note 52. 
11
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would reduce or eliminate the need for more federal funding after 
future disasters. A specific determination should be sought from 
HUD on this topic. 
B. Transportation 
The U.S. Department of Transportation is another viable 
source of funding for transportation projects involving parks. 
Federal transportation funds have been available to parks 
through multi-year funding bills like the Intermodal Surface 
Transportation and Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991, the 
Transportation Enhancement Act for the 21st Century (TEA 21) 
of 1998, and the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century 
Act (MAP-21) of 2012.54  Eligible projects have included biking, 
hiking, and pedestrian improvement projects in parks.55  New 
York State received at least $67 million in 2014 for these sorts of 
projects.56 
These funds are dwarfed by the federal monies made 
available for traditional highway work. New York State, for 
example, received $1.3 billion from the Federal Transportation 
Administration for fiscal year 2014.57  It could be possible to tap 
traditional transportation funds for maintenance and restoration 
of parks immediately adjacent to highways. Many flagship parks 
are adjacent to or bisected by highways (sometimes by design) 
that damage the nearby open space and increase the costs of their 
maintenance, cause polluted run-off to water bodies, and create 
pedestrian and wildlife barriers. Conversely, those parks serve 
 
 54. Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 
126 Stat. 405 (2012); Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. 
No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998); Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991). 
 55. 23 U.S.C. § 101(a)(30)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 56. Press Release, Andrew Cuomo, N.Y.S. Governor, Governor Cuomo 
Announces $67 Million in Funding for Bicycle, Pedestrian and Multi-Use Path 
Enhancement Projects (January 15, 2014), available at 
http://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-67-million-
funding-bicycle-pedestrian-and-multi-use-path-enhancement, archived at 
http://perma.cc/85HX-48MH. 
 57. Funding by State, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.fta.dot. 
gov/12853_88.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/V4ZY-9Q4Z (providing detailed analysis of FTA’s annual 
appropriations to states by program). 
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essential transportation purposes by serving as a buffer between 
highways and residential communities. Joint parks-
transportation planning should recognize this relationship and 
tap into federal funds for regular restoration of parkland adjacent 
to highways. 
C. Ecosystem Services 
Many of the ecosystem services that parks provide are hard 
to quantify and monetize.  For example, parks filter air pollution, 
cool temperatures in the urban heat island, and provide wildlife 
habitat.  But at least one habitat providing ecosystem services—
wetlands on NYC Parks property—can be monetized to the 
benefit of parks through the creation of wetlands mitigation 
banks.58 
Under the U.S. Clean Water Act and New York Tidal 
Wetlands Act, the destruction of tidal wetlands requires a permit 
from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and N.Y. State 
Department of Environmental Conservation.59  Although not 
required by the statutes, these agencies generally require 
mitigation as a condition for issuing a permit that allows 
destruction of wetlands.60  Mitigation usually takes the form of 
permanent protection of wetlands or restoration of degraded 
wetlands.  Developers and some government agencies, such as the 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, often seek to buy 
mitigation credits, but there are few such banks supplying credits 
in the New York metropolitan area. 
 
 58. JOSH FOSTER ET AL., CTR FOR CLEAN AIR POL’Y, THE VALUE OF GREEN 
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR URBAN CLIMATE ADAPTATION 3 (2011), available at 
http://ccap.org/assets/The-Value-of-Green-Infrastructure-for-Urban-Climate-
Adaptation_CCAP-Feb-2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NQR4-RVLW. 
 59. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012) (requiring section 404 for permits for discharges 
of dredge or fill material into navigable waters). See generally N.Y. ENVTL. 
CONSERV. LAW § 25-0401 (McKinney 2014) (broadly regulating activities 
impacting tidal wetlands). 
 60. 33 C.F.R. § 332.1 (a)(1) (2014) (“The purpose of this part is to establish 
standards and criteria for the use of all types of compensatory mitigation, 
including on-site and off-site permittee-responsible mitigation, mitigation 
banks, and in-lieu fee mitigation to offset unavoidable impacts to waters of the 
United States authorized through the issuance of Department of the Army (DA) 
permits pursuant to section 404 of the Clean Water Act.”). 
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Restoring degraded wetlands is incredibly expensive. A 2012 
City wetlands report therefore recommended creating a privately-
operated wetlands mitigation bank operated on city property.  It 
states: 
The City will develop a mitigation banking or in-lieu fee 
mechanism for public projects. These are strategies for 
undertaking restoration projects that can then provide “credits” 
to multiple projects that require mitigation, at one or more 
locations carefully chosen and approved in advance by regulators. 
Both mechanisms provide numerous benefits over the current 
system by consolidating funding into larger projects that produce 
economies and ecologies of scale.61 
In late 2013, the New York City Economic Development 
issued a request for expressions of interest (RFEI) for a private 
partner to develop a wetlands mitigation bank on sixty-eight 
acres near Saw Mill Creek on Staten Island.62  The creek flows 
into the Arthur Kill and has been degraded by highways, 
landfills, and pollution.  The private partner would, presumably, 
fund all or most of the cost of restoring the wetlands in return for 
the right to sell those credits to developers and agencies that need 
Clean Water Act section 404 permits from the U.S. Army Corp of 
Engineers. The City reportedly received a poor response to the 
RFEI. It should try again in light of the successful wetlands 
mitigation banks being developed in other states. 
Given the costs that a private partner would incur to restore 
wetlands in order to create saleable credits, it is very unlikely 
that the City or State would profit from these programs. It would, 
however, find a private source of revenue for restoring the 
hundreds of degraded wetlands in parks. The City and State may 
also be able to cooperate with the National Park Service for the 
creation of such a program in Gateway National Recreation Area, 
which includes almost 10,000 acres of federally owned wetlands 
 
 61. N.Y.C. WETLANDS STRATEGY, supra note 3. 
 62. Press Release, N.Y.C. Econ. Dev. Corp., NYCEDC Releases Request for 
Expressions of Interest to Establish First Wetlands Bank in New York City 
(Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://www.nycedc.com/press-release/nycedc-
releases-request-expressions-interest-establish-first-wetlands-bank-new-york, 
archived at http://perma.cc/MR9R-8RVQ. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/1
1_RIZZO FINAL_EDITED 10/2/2015  2:17 PM 
2015] EQUITABLE PARKS FUNDING 649 
 
that are vitally important to buffering Brooklyn, Queens, and 
Staten Island from coastal storms and sea level rise. 
VI. STATE AUTHORITIES AND PUBLIC BENEFIT 
CORPORATIONS 
New state-created entities might be used to restore existing 
parks. State entities already play a major role in the City’s most 
important parks. They include state-controlled public benefit 
corporations like the Battery Park City Authority, Hudson River 
Park Trust, and Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation and city-
controlled (but state-created) public benefit corporations like the 
Brooklyn Bridge Park Development Corporation. Another major 
park on Governors Island was originally overseen by the state-
created Governors Island Planning and Education Corporation, 
which  was replaced by the city-created Trust for Governors 
Island.63 
Because the state corporations can override local land-use 
controls,64 do not pay local property taxes,65 and are not subject 
to local politics, they can be nimble tools for turning around 
deteriorated neighborhoods and their parks. As noted above, 
these state-city partnerships are already in use for parks in New 
York City. The state parks mentioned above face daunting and 
unresolved capital costs, yet they are generally well maintained 
with a steady revenue stream from adjacent real estate.66  
 
 63. The Urban Development Corporation (d/b/a Empire State Development 
Corporation) has the authority to create subsidiaries and is the likely entity to 
oversee the creation of new state public benefit corporations to address the goals 
outlined in this paper.  For example, the Urban Development Corporation 
created the Moynihan Station Development Corporation in 1995 to oversee the 
conversion of the U.S. Post Office’s Farley Building in Manhattan into a new 
commuter rail station.  Phase 1 of the project, which will create commuter 
access to Amtrak and other improvements, is underway. Moynihan Station Dev. 
Corp.: About the Project, EMPIRE STATE DEVELOPMENT (Mar. 4, 2015, 11:27 AM), 
http://esd.ny.gov/Subsidiaries_Projects/MSDC/MSDC.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/K2C5-SEAF. 
 64. See In re Cnty. of Monroe, 530 N.E.2d 202, 204-05 (N.Y. 1988). 
 65. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 404 (West 2014). 
 66. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6388 (McKinney 2014); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 
1974 (McKinney 2014) (powers); id. § 1974-b. These laws provide the Roosevelt 
Island Operating Corporation and the Battery Park City Authority with the 
power to collect rents on the land they control in NYC. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 
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Moreover, the state entities are held directly accountable for the 
conditions of the public amenities they operate. The result is a 
higher level of care and maintenance than is provided to most 
city-run parks. 
The creation of a new state entity to operate parks in a 
distressed community might work as follows. The city would 
identify a park or group of nearby parks that are 1) in need and 2) 
near substantial development sites that are under public control 
or could be acquired through eminent domain. The Urban 
Development Corporation, doing business as the Empire State 
Development Corporation, is the state agency responsible with 
the most logical role to play because of its economic development 
mission and ability to create subsidiaries with all of its statutory 
powers.67  It would create a new subsidiary with the mission to 
acquire and develop the land, carry out public improvements and 
maintain existing parks.68  To attract developers, the state entity 
would fund some initial public improvements with state and city 
appropriations and bond issuances.  It would then offer publicly 
owned or controlled land to developers at a reduced cost. Rather 
than pay property taxes, developers of this public land would 
make “payments in lieu of taxes” directly to the state entity to be 
used exclusively for repaying bonds, maintaining public 
improvements and restoring parks.69  This method of 
development and revenue generation is already used by the state 
entities mentioned above. 
The technique could be paired with affordable housing 
requirements. For example, the City and Urban Development 
Corporation partnered in 1968 to develop Roosevelt Island with 
parks, streets, new schools, and thousands of units of affordable 
 
6388; N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1974. In the case of BPCA, the statute is specific in 
saying that property owners do not pay real estate taxes to NYC but rather give 
those revenues to the BPCA. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1974. Roosevelt Island 
Operating Corporation and BPCA are thus able to generate their own revenues 
and use them to maintain streets, sidewalks, and parks.  
 67. Urban Development Corporation Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 6255(8), 
6262 (McKinney 2014). 
 68. See generally N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 6255(8), 6262 (the Urban 
Development Corporation is empowered to create subsidiaries that have all of 
the parent corporation’s powers). 
 69. To bypass local property taxes, the state entity must own or control the 
land. 
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housing.70  The Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation (RIOC) 
enforces affordable housing requirements through its ground 
leases with private developers, and has thus created thousands of 
affordable housing units.71  With the revenue from the leases, the 
corporation maintains various public services on the Island, 
including parks.72  Without this state-city partnership, Roosevelt 
Island’s excellent parks would otherwise not exist. Besides having 
greater budget authority, the state public benefit corporations 
like RIOC also have greater planning autonomy, eminent domain 
authority, and the ability to override local land-use controls.73 
VII. BIDS AND PIDS 
New York State law allows any municipality to establish a 
business improvement district (hereinafter BID) to restore or 
promote business activity by building and maintaining 
improvements, including parks, landscaping, and 
transportation.74  Under the BID law, municipalities can create 
nonprofit corporations to receive a supplement property tax, 
sometimes called an “assessment,” that is exclusively used for the 
public services outlined above.75  New York City has over sixty 
BIDs that largely focus on maintenance of streets, sidewalks, and 
public plazas.76 
 
 70. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6292 (McKinney 2014). The Urban 
Development Corporation and New York City entered into a 99 year lease for 
Roosevelt Island that required the Urban Development Corporation to carry out 
a “general development plan” for affordable housing, transit, parks, and other 
improvements. In 1984, the Urban Development Corporation created a 
subsidiary, the Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation (RIOC), to continue its 
duties on the Island. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6385 (McKinney 2014). 
 71. Alan Finder, Roosevelt Island: A ‘Wonderful’ Experiment Still Building, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/26/ 
nyregion/roosevelt-island-a-wonderful-experiment-still-building.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/7TWD-WTNE. 
 72. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6388 (McKinney 2014); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 
1974 (McKinney 2014) (powers); see also id. § 1974-b. 
 73. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6389(3) (McKinney 2014). 
 74. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-c (McKinney 2014). 
 75. Id. § 980-c(a). 
 76. N.Y.C. SMALL BUS. SERVS., STARTING A BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT A 
STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE 2 (2015), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/sbs/ 
downloads/pdf/bid_guide_complete.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8GNX-T4X3. 
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BIDs have the potential to raise millions of dollars for the 
maintenance of parks with few adverse effects on nearby property 
owners. In fact, BIDs are specifically geared towards 
maintenance and are, therefore, uniquely suited to addressing 
the maintenance shortfall plaguing urban parks.77  In New York 
City there are two BIDs operating as Park Improvement Districts 
(PIDs). The Bryant Park Corporation collects about $1 million 
annually from nearby property owners; this $1 million makes up 
only a small portion of the Bryant Park Corporation’s annual $12 
million budget for Bryant Park.78  The Union Square Partnership 
raises about $1.5 million annually.79  Both districts are narrowly 
drawn to include only large commercial properties very close to 
the parks. 
There is nothing in New York State law, however, that 
prohibits the creation of much larger districts that can raise 
millions annually for the parks they surround. Four 
misconceptions have probably limited their use for parks to date. 
 
 Misconception 1: Residents must approve the creation of 
the district. 
 
Partially incorrect: In New York State, the law requires 
approval of a majority of the owners in the proposed district. In 
New York City, the City Council votes on the creation of a district 
subject to review and recommendations by community boards and 
the City Planning Commission. Only if at least fifty-one percent 
of property owners file petitions in opposition does state or city 
law prohibit the council from establishing the district.80  In 
practice, the Council seeks community consensus. 
 
 77. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-a(4). 
 78. BRYANT PARK CORP. & BRYANT PARK MGMT. CORP. & KPMG LLP, 
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 3-4 (2013), available at 
http://www.bryantpark.org/static/pdfs/reports/Bryant_Park_FY_2013.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/2R5J-FQJQ. 
 79. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF SMALL BUS. SERVS., NYC BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT 
PROFILES 2008-2009 11, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/sbs/ 
downloads/pdf/BID%20book%20final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E24F-
8GLJ (listing income from the assessment of $1,439,000). 
 80. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CODE § 25-406(b) (2014) (enacted pursuant to N.Y. 
GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-d(a)). 
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 Misconception 2: Residential properties cannot be taxed. 
 
Incorrect: The BID law anticipates that both commercial and 
residential property owners will be taxed.81 
 
 Misconception 3: BIDs cannot primarily benefit parks. 
 
Partially incorrect: The law calls for the creation and 
maintenance of improvements to “restore or promote business 
activity in the district.”82  Given the clear link between well-
maintained parks and property values, this link is easy to 
establish. Moreover, park concessions already generate tens of 
millions of dollars for the city and state. 
 
 Misconception 4: BIDs cannot raise enough money to 
meaningfully maintain parks. 
 
Incorrect: BIDS can raise money to completely transform the 
maintenance of large parks. For example, at least 40,000 people 
live within census tracts immediately bordering Van Cortlandt 
Park.83  Assuming an average household size of 2.6 persons, there 
are about 15,000 housing units near the park.  With an average 
supplemental property tax per household of $100, a PID for Van 
Corlandt Park would raise $1.5 million annually. This is enough 
to hire two dozen new staff members dedicated solely to 
maintenance of this park. 
 
Remarkably, BIDs can also include cooperation by two 
municipalities.  The law would allow, for example, New York City 
and Yonkers to jointly fund and operate Van Corltandt Park for 
 
 81. Id. § 25-414(b) (enacted pursuant to N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-n(d)). 
Neither the state nor city laws contain any provision limiting taxation to 
commercial properties. In fact, the laws require the board of directors of the 
district management association to include residents. 
 82. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CODE § 25-404(a) (2014) (enacted pursuant to N.Y. 
GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-c(a)). 
 83. N.Y.C. Census FactFinder, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, 
http://maps.nyc.gov/census/#, archived at http://perma.cc/CH8C-KBJC. 
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the benefit of both municipalities.84  The creation of BIDs for 
existing parks will not be easy, as shown by the failed proposals 
from the Hudson River Park Trust and Friends of the High 
Line.85  For large, flagship parks, however, these districts are the 
best alternative revenue source for maintenance that does not 
require new legislation. 
Some park advocates propose a citywide park tax as an 
alternative to park-specifics PIDs.  Chicago has had a Chicago 
Park Tax District since 1934.86  It is operated by a distinct 
municipal corporation that imposes property taxes separately 
from the city, the city’s school district, and the county.87  It is 
entirely responsible for funding the city’s parks, comprising 8,000 
acres in 585 parks.88  Most of its revenues come from the property 
tax with the rest coming from bonds, permit fees, and concession 
fees.89  The system works well and is commended by independent 
authorities. For example, the Trust for Public Land gives Chicago 
a decent rating in its online “Park Score” system.90 
Seattle voters approved the creation of a city-wide park 
district in the August 2014 elections.91 The system will work a 
little differently from Chicago’s district, as the City of Seattle will 
 
 84. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980, 980-n(a) (McKinney 2014). 
 85. See generally Annie Karni, Advocates Eye Levy to Save Hudson River 
Park, CRAIN’S N.Y BUS., June 2, 2013, http://www.crainsnewyork 
.com/article/20130602/HOSPITALITY_TOURISM/306029987/advocates-eye-levy 
-to-save-hudson-river-park, archived at http://perma.cc/E462-64LB; Dana 
Rubenstein, Special Tax Sought to Fund Hudson River Park, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
14, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703555404576195 
520506542928#livefyre-comment, archived at http://perma.cc/T4H7-LJ3N. 
 86. History, CHICAGO PARK DIST., http://www.chicagoparkdistrict.com/about-
us/history/, archived at http://perma.cc/4YFU-4L93. 
 87. See CHICAGO PARK DIST., 2015 BUDGET SUMMARY 28-29 (2015), available at 
http://www.chicagoparkdistrict.com/assets/1/23/2015_Budget_Summary_-
_Adopted_Budget_12.12.14_-_Web1.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/E34C-
DPHH?type=pdf [hereinafter 2015 BUDGET SUMMARY]. 
 88. CHICAGO PARK DIST., supra note 86. 
 89. 2015 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 87, at 5. 
 90. City Profiles, PARKSCORE, http://parkscore.tpl.org/city.php?city=Chicago 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/G8M5-6EFF. 
 91. City of Seattle Proposition No. 1 Seattle Park District, KING COUNTY 
ELECTIONS, https://electionsdata.kingcounty.gov/2014/election-results-aug/two 
/Ballot%20measures/City%20of%20Seattle%20Proposition%20No.%201%20Seat
tle%20Park%20District (last updated Feb. 24, 2014), archived at 
https://perma.cc/ZT7B-FC7H. 
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continue to fund parks at pre-existing levels from the general 
budget. The Seattle Park District will provide supplemental 
revenue through a new property tax of $0.33 per $1,000 of 
assessed value, which translates to about $149 annually for a 
$450,000 home.92  It is expected to raise $47.9 million per year.93 
A city-wide park tax district would be challenging in New 
York. First, like any new tax, the municipality would require 
approval of the New York State Legislature, which is currently 
hostile to the creation of any new tax. Second, to actually have 
net benefit for parks, the municipality would need to commit to 
maintain current levels of budget support. Third, community 
support for a new general  tax is likely to be very weak. The 
existing BID law is preferable because it has the potential to 
create real community buy-in: it would be a small new tax 
structured to directly benefit those paying it. 
VIII. DEDICATED PARK FUNDS 
One of the biggest lost opportunities for park funding is the 
State’s annual failure to finance the Environmental Protection 
Fund (EPF).94  The State Legislature created the fund in 1993 to 
pay for solid waste management, parks, historic preservation and 
open space.95  It is funded almost entirely through the State’s real 
estate transfer tax, which generates over $700 million per year.96  
 




archived at http://perma.cc/6ZT4-LKEJ. 
 93. Id. For more information about the Seattle Park District, visit the King 
County board of elections webpage. KING COUNTY ELECTIONS, 
http://kingcounty.gov/elections/election-info/2015/201502.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/589A-XH2V (last visited Mar. 4, 2015). 
 94. See generally WE LOVE NEW YORK, http://www.keepprotectingny.com, 
archived at http://perma.cc/595H-3J4L (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (stating that a 
statewide coalition of environmental organizations, is advocating for greater 
EPF funding). 
 95. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 92-s (McKinney 2013). 
 96. See generally N.Y. TAX LAW § 1402 (McKinney 2014). See also N.Y. STATE 
DEP’T OF TAXATION AND FINANCE, 2013-2014 NEW YORK STATE TAX COLLECTIONS: 
STATISTICAL SUMMARIES AND HISTORICAL TABLES 8 (2014), available at 
http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/stats/stat_fy/2013_14_annual_statistical_report_of_ny
_state_tax_collections.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/XT5M-BF9Q?type=pdf. 
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The fund is dependent, however, on legislative appropriations: 
the State’s governors and legislators have traditionally allocated 
less than $200 million to the fund, using the remainder to balance 
the state budget.97 
Although the state real estate transfer tax is well known to 
home-owning New York State residents, the public is largely 
unaware that the tax was intended to directly benefit parks and 
the environment. Park advocates have so far been unable to tell 
the story. Based on its share of the state’s population, New York 
City could secure $200 million from the fund each year.98  The 
city should therefore mount an extensive public relations 
campaign to end Albany’s practice of raiding the EPF to balance 
the state budget. Some states like New Jersey have amended 
their constitutions to prohibit the legislatures from using 
dedicated environmental taxes for other purposes.99  Advocates 
for the EPF should consider the same for New York. 
Congress has similarly used the U.S. Land and Water 
Conservation Fund (LWCF) to balance the federal budget since 
its creation in 1964. The federal government funds the LWCF 
primarily through fees for mineral, oil and gas extraction licenses 
on the outer continental shelf.100  All license fees are deposited in 
the fund. The law allows Congress to allocate up to $900 million 
to federal, state and local park projects each year until the fund’s 
expiration in 2015. 101 
Revenues from offshore oil and gas drilling have risen 
sharply in the past decade and now generate almost $10 billion 
annually.102  Congress, however, has appropriated an average of 
 
 97. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 92-s; see also OFFICE OF BUDGET & POLICY 
ANALYSIS, ENVIRONMENTAL FUNDING IN NEW YORK STATE 19 (2014), available at 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/environmental/environmental_funding_nys_2
014.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/3JSP-JHDQ?type=pdf. 
 98. Id. 
 99. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/ 
lawsconstitution/constitution.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/Y78Y-YDD9. 
 100. Land and Water Conservation Fund, 16 U.S.C. § 460l-5 (2014) (Congress 
passed the Land and Water Conservation Fund act in 1964). 
 101. Id. 
 102. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-283, HIGH RISK SERIES, AN 
UPDATE 76 (2013). 
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only $300 million to the LWCF annually.103  The rest of the 
money is swept into the nation’s $3.6 trillion budget.104  
Nationwide park advocates like the City Parks Alliance and the 
Land & Water Conservation Fund Coalition are lobbying 
Congress to provide the full $900 million to park projects each 
year and permanently reauthorize the LWCF.105  New York City 
and State should join this advocacy campaign as they are 
positioned to receive tens of millions each year from the LWCF.106  
The $900 million cap should be annually raised, the law should be 
permanently reauthorized and Congressional appropriations to 
the fund should be mandatory. 
IX. OTHER FUNDING SOURCES IN BRIEF AND 
THEIR POLITICAL OBSTACLES 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the most promising 
alternative revenue options for parks. However, there are several 
other promising revenue options that may work for some parks. 
A. Concessions 
Despite some high-profile citizen lawsuits challenging 
revenue-generating concessions in parks, there is little doubt 
about their legality, so long as they serve park users. New York 
 
 103. Land and Water Conservation Fund, 16 U.S.C. § 460l-5; Land and Water 
Conservation Fund, Our land, our water, our heritage: America Depends on the 
land and water conservation fund, LAND AND WATER CONSERVATION FUND 
COALITION, available at http://lwcfcoalition.org/files/LWCFInfo/LWCF 
_general_factsheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/483L-LN3D. 
 104. See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2015: HISTORICAL 
TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 25 (2015), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/hist.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/H9E6-EHQR (demonstrating that the Federal 
Government’s total budget for the year 2014 is approximately $3.6 trillion). 
 105. LAND & WATER CONSERVATION FUND COAL., LAND AND WATER 
CONSERVATION FUND: 50 YEARS OF CONSERVING AMERICA THE BEAUTIFUL 2, 3 
(2014), available at http://www.lwcfcoalition.org/files/LWCF_ 
50thAnniversaryReport_FINAL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YA5L-NLQJ. 
 106. This is a rough estimation based upon New York City and New York 
State’s proportion of the general population, or approximately 19 million out of 
318 million. U.S. and World Population Clock, CENSUS.GOV (Feb. 25, 2015), 
http://www.census.gov/popclock/, archived at http://perma.cc/L3ZZ-B5D8. 
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City, in the 2009 fiscal year, generated about $110 million from 
park concessions.107  OPRHP raises a similar amount in state 
parks.108  There is room for growth in many flagship parks that 
lack restaurants and other amusements. The problem for NYC 
Parks is that the New York City Charter requires it to surrender 
any revenue it generates to the general city fund.109  OPRHP 
faces the same problem. NYC Parks and OPRHP must rely on the 
City Council and State Legislature to return the monies in the 
annual budget.110 
There are two ways around the “general fund” problem. First, 
for parks maintained by conservancies, the city and state can 
authorize the conservancy to directly collect concession revenues 
and use them to maintain the park.111  Second, the city and state 
can require concessionaires to be responsible for maintenance and 
improvements to designated areas. 
B. Sponsorships 
In 2012, New York City unsuccessfully issued an RFP for 
corporate sponsorships of certain park amenities like dog runs 
and basketball courts. The RFP failed to generate substantial 
interest in part because the sponsorship opportunities were so 
modest.  Sponsorships can work, however, if the arrangement 
provides adequate publicity in return. In 2004, NYC Parks won 
$10 million from Carl Icahn for the construction of Icahn Stadium 
on Randalls Island (Manhattan).112  In 2013, the Prospect Park 
Alliance won $10 million from the Lefrak family to build the 
 
 107. Concessions, NYC PARKS, http://www.nycgovparks.org/opportunities 
/concessions, archived at http://perma.cc/E5DG-2Y5Y (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
 108. Tables, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION & HISTORIC PRES., 
https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy1314archive/eBudget1314/agencyPres
entations/appropData/tables_ParksRecreationandHistoricPreservationOfficeof.h
tml, archived at https://perma.cc/FBA8-WDVM (last updated Jan. 22, 2013). 
 109. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER § 109 (2012). 
 110. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER § 109. 
 111. See Concessions, supra note 107. 
 112. Press Release, N.Y.C. Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, Mayor, Mayor 
Michael R. Bloomberg, Parks & Recreation Commission Adrian Benepe & the 
Randall’s Island Sports Foundation Name New York City’s Newest Athletic 
Facility Icahn Stadium (Jan. 28, 2004), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-
mayor/news/021-04/mayor-michael-bloomberg-parks-recreation-commissioner-
adrian-benepe-the-randall-s-island, archived at http://perma.cc/YXF4-UWW3. 
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Lefrak Center at Lakeside (Brooklyn).113  High-profile capital 
projects such as these are likely to attract sponsors. Although 
some park advocates will claim that corporate sponsorships and 
naming contribute to the over-commercialization of parks, 
sponsorships and naming rights raise no legal issues. 
C. Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs) 
CBAs are usually private agreements between developers 
and community groups to provide support for schools, parks, jobs, 
and social services. They have no legal status in local land-use 
review processes.114  But developers often use them to win 
support for a project, and elected officials sometimes unofficially 
link their support for a project to a developer’s willingness to 
enter into a CBA. While legal experts have raised some objections 
to CBAs because they create a shadow land-use process, CBAs 
can provide large, once-in-a-lifetime park funds. Their use for 
creation of operating endowments for parks is particularly 
promising since long-term park maintenance is in any developer’s 
best interest. 
D. “Capitalizing” Maintenance Costs 
State law prohibits the issuance of state bonds to cover 
general government operating expenses.115  It is possible, 
however, that NYC Parks or OPRHP could build future costs to 
renovate capital improvements into a legislative appropriation or 
bond issuance as a “capital” rather than a “maintenance” 
expense. The money would be set aside in an endowment to cover 
future maintenance costs. The City and State should consult with 
 
 113. Press Release, Prospect Park Alliance, Lakeside Receives $10 Million Gift 
from LeFrak Family (Nov. 11, 2013), http://prospectpark.org/media/filer 
_public/2d/59/2d59a7e6-f698-4e8f-8472-8fa0b887d238/111113-lakeside-receives-
10-million-gift-from-lefrak-family-final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6R89-
TYER. 
 114. See generally N.Y.C. BAR ASSOC., THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY BENEFIT 
AGREEMENTS IN N.Y.C’S LAND USE PROCESS (Mar 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071844-TheRoleofCommunity 
BenefitAgreementsinNYCLandUseProcess.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
W26F-56NE (The New York City Bar Association released a comprehensive and 
highly critical report on CBAs). 
 115. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 67-b(3) (McKinney 2004). 
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their respective comptrollers’ offices, which would need to sign off 
on any approach of this type. 
E. Selective Alienation 
The public trust doctrine prohibits the sale or lease of 
parkland for any purpose without state legislative approval.116  
The practice of selling, leasing or otherwise using parkland for 
nonpark purposes (referred to as “alienation”) is highly 
controversial and often litigated.117  Nonetheless, New York’s 
municipalities have occasionally sought legislative approval for 
the creation of public infrastructure in a park, like New York 
City’s controversial water filtration plant in Van Cortland 
Park.118  The State Legislature traditionally requires 
replacement parkland or financial mitigation in return for 
parkland alienation.119 
A few large parks with inaccessible areas, especially former 
solid waste landfills, may be suitable for revenue generation from 
non-park uses like solar panel arrays, wind turbines or 
stormwater management infrastructure. Moreover, long-term 
leases for certain private, revenue-generating uses like catering 
halls or golf courses may be appropriate in some locations. The 
test for any such alienation action should be whether it would 
directly contribute to the long-term maintenance of the impacted 
park and have minimal impacts on public recreation and the 
environment. 
 
 116. Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 
1053 (N.Y. 2001) (defining the public trust doctrine as follows: “no objects, 
however worthy, . . .  which have no connection with park purposes, should be 
permitted to encroach upon [parkland] without legislative authority plainly 
conferred.” (citing Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121 (N.Y. 1920)). 
 117. Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 
1053. 
 118. Legislative Memorandum relating to Ch. 175: PARKS—
DISCONTINUANCE—NEW YORK CITY, 2003 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 175 Legis. 
Memo Ch. 175 (McKinney 2003). 
 119. HANDBOOK, supra note 36. 
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F. General Obligation Bonds 
Some states make good use of state-wide, voter-approved 
bond acts to provide open space funding.  New York State, by 
contrast, has a limited ability to issue new bonds. The State 
Comptroller reported in 2013 that the State can only borrow 
another $509 million before reaching its constitutional debt 
limit.120  State-wide bond initiatives that have previously funded 
parks and open space, like the highly successful Clean 
Water/Clean Air Bond Act of 1996, will therefore be difficult to 
implement. 
New York City is in slightly better standing with regard to 
bonds.  Its overall debt is quite high, at about $52 billion out of a 
total debt limit of close to $76 billion. It can thus borrow another 
$24 billion.121  New York City has not traditionally issued bonds 
to pay for parks and it may be unwise to do so in light of looming 
capital needs for transit, bridges, schools, and coastal climate 
resiliency. The issuance of bonds to pay for joint park and 
infrastructure projects would, however, be a smart idea.122 
G. Capital Budget Reform 
For the 2013 to 2014 fiscal year, the City’s budget gave NYC 
Parks a discretionary capital fund of about $80 million dollars in 
addition to its operating budget of $300 million dollars for the 
first time.123  This discretionary fund is essential to allowing the 
 
 120. Press Release, Thomas P. DiNapoli, Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, 
DiNapoli: State’s High Debt Limiting Options (Jan. 7, 2013), 
www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/jan13/010713.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/L2RY-5EZR. (Bonds issued by some state authorities (e.g., 
Battery Park City Authority) are not subject to the debt limit so long as the 
bonds are not payable by the State.). See id. Moreover, tax-increment finance 
bonds are not subject to the debt limit. See infra, notes 124-30 and 
accompanying text. 
 121. N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, BUREAU OF FISCAL AND BUDGET STUDIES, FISCAL 
YEAR 2013 ANNUAL REPORT ON CAPITAL DEBT AND OBLIGATIONS vii (Dec. 2012). 
See also N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (defining municipal debt limits). 
 122. Capital budget reform is important in New York City where for the first 
time, NYC Parks has its own, small discretionary capital budget. This practice 
should be continued. 
 123. Dana Rubenstein, Mayor Continues City Parks Funding Policies, For 
Now, CAPITAL N.Y. (May 9, 2014), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/city-
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department to address capital projects without being beholden to 
specific appropriations from elected officials. 
H. Tax Increment Finance (TIF) 
Tax increment finance is a method of financing public 
improvements based on projected future property tax revenues. A 
government entity identifies public street, sidewalk, utility, or 
open space improvements that it believes will encourage nearby 
real estate development. It sells bonds to fund those 
improvements and commits to using new property tax revenues 
to repaying bondholders.124  The technique requires a certain 
faith on the part of bondholders, who will only be repaid to the 
extent that the public improvements actually increase property 
tax revenue.125  Outside New York State, the technique works: 
other states have issued billions in TIF bonds to fund public 
improvements.126 
New York State law allows state or local agencies to issue 
TIF bonds too,127 but they have almost never done so.128  In 2005, 
New York City considered selling TIF bonds to fund the Hudson 
Yards project, which involved large public investments in a deck 
above rail yards that would facilitate new development, parks 
and roads.129  Concerns about revenue led to a hybrid approach 
wherein the City remains responsible for paying back 
bondholders from general city revenues. 
A 2002 report by the New York City Independent Budget 




 124. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-o (McKinney 2014). See generally Amy F. 
Cerciello, The Use of Pilot Financing to Develop Manhattan’s Far West Side, 32 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 795, 796-801 (2005). 
 125. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-o. 
 126. Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and 
the Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 65 (2010). 
 127. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 970-o. 
 128. Cerciello, supra note 124, at 816. 
 129. See generally N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, WEST SIDE FINANCING’S 
COMPLEX, $1.3 BILLION STORY (2004), available at http://www.ibo.nyc. 
ny.us/iboreports/WestsidefinanceFB.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8C7M-
TPYW. 
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Actual TIF revenues may fall short of the projections made when 
the TIF bonds were sold.  Unlike a municipality with a variety of 
revenue sources to draw upon for debt service obligations, a TIF 
district generally has only one source: incremental property 
taxes. A shortfall risks default or a bailout using other municipal 
revenues, undermining the reason for using TIF in the first 
place. A revenue shortfall can occur for a variety of reasons. The 
projected level of development might not be reached––or might be 
reached with significant delay.130 
These concerns can be addressed by issuing TIF bonds only 
where nearby development is likely.  Moreover, revenue 
calculations must remain conservative.  If these two issues are 
addressed, TIF can become a vital tool for generating major 
capital funds for parks where they otherwise do not exist. 
I. Other Federal Funds 
Congress created the Urban Park and Recreation Recovery 
Act (UPARR) in 1978 to provide matching grants to distressed 
cities for park projects.131  Unlike the EPF and the LWCF, it is 
funded out of the general budget rather than specific taxes.  The 
argument for full funding of UPARR is therefore slightly less 
compelling. Congress has not funded the program at all since 
2002. Nonetheless, because of its focus on distressed 
communities, any funding would help New York’s urban parks. 
X. SUMMARY OF BEST PRACTICES 
This paper has identified five core ways to raise park funding 
for both maintenance and capital improvements without new 
federal, state, or city legislation. They include the following: 1) 
Tapping into real estate dollars using existing zoning tools (e.g., 
TDRs, zoning incentives); 2) Using the existing Business 
Improvement District law to maintain parks; 3) Demanding full 
 
 130. Theresa J. Devine, Learning from Experience: A Primer on Tax Increment 
Financing, N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE (Sept. 2002), http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us 
/iboreports/TIF-Sept2002.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S5B7-VD6Y. 
 131. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2514 (2012); see also NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, 
www.nps.gov/uparr (last vistied Dec. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/UZ9U-
KHZD. 
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state and federal funding for existing park funds; 4) Creating 
public-public partnerships to tap into existing infrastructure 
funds for capital and maintenance work in parks; and 5) 
Pursuing proven management models using state agencies and 
private conservancies. These approaches have the most promise 
for creating new and reliable sources of both capital and 
maintenance funds. There is no one-size-fits-all solution, 
however, given the variety of parks, income levels, and 
neighborhoods. Most important, community support will be 
essential to the success of any park funding venture. Residents 
are likely to react poorly to financing schemes that diminish the 
public’s use of a park or are simply viewed as new citywide taxes. 
Public support depends on keeping new revenues and their 
benefits local, visible, and accounted for. 
 
Appendix: List of Alternative Revenue Options  
Addressed Above 
1. Transfers of Development Rights and Zoning 
Incentives. 
2. Public-Public Partnerships for Climate Change, 
Transportation, Affordable Housing and Public 
Health. 
3. Park Improvement Districts 
4. State-Created Public Benefit Corporations 
5. Full Funding for the U.S. Land and Water 
Conservation Fund and N.Y. State Environmental 
Protection Fund 
6. Concessions 
7. Sponsorships and Naming Rights 
8. Capitalizing Maintenance Costs 
9. Selective Alienation of Parks 
10. General Obligation Bonds 
11. Capital Budget Reform 
12. Tax Increment Finance 
13. Urban Park and Recreation Recovery Program 
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